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Abstract
Statistics for aviation accidents in Korea show that the safety level of training flights is high.
However, of the accidents that do occur, more than 80% occur due to human factors.
Furthermore, because most causes of human factors-related accidents are “pilot error,” it is
important for student pilots who will transport passengers to develop knowledge of safety and
skills associated with human factors risk management to mitigate the risk of such accidents.
To investigate the human factors that affect safety in training student pilots for flight, this
study examined the correlation between events that are associated with accidents, differences
according to the pilot’s experience level of flight training, and differences between student
pilots who received flight training at approved collegiate flight education centers and those
who did not. The study was conducted on human factors, focusing on the SHELL model.
Using the SPSS software (ver. 17.0), correlation analyses, analyses of variance (ANOVA),
and t-tests were conducted to generate statistical results.
Briefly, the results of this study found that a student pilot’s natural ability and equipment
in the cockpit are the important factors for safety for pilot on training flights. Additionally,
the analysis of the differences between human factors according to the characteristics of
student pilots’ groups shows that college student pilots are effected by immanent factors and
organizational cultures.
To date, there have been no accidents with related human casualties when training at
collegiate “Approved Training Organizations” (ATOs) in Korea. However, accidents can
occur at anytime and anywhere. Especially human factors, which cause most aviation
accidents, have a wide reach and are impossible to eliminate. Because ATO is the starting
point to lead the aviation industry of Korea, awareness of risks and initiatives to improve
education/training of human factors is essential.
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1. Introduction
“Human factors” have become a significant issue in aviation safety because a high percentage
of aviation accidents are caused by human factors. Training on human factors is regarded
seriously for aviation personnel in Korea; thus, training programs, such as Crew Resource

management (CRM) and Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), are often emphasized by
airlines.
As seen in curricula related to human factors in traditional flight training centers in Korea,
only designated prerequisite subjects are required to obtain a pilot’s license. For the private
pilot course, only 12 hours are assigned for human performance and limitation classes of the
total 180 hours of courses, and for a commercial pilot’s license, 20 hours out of 510 hours are
assigned. Thus, these training centers dedicate less than 10% of total course duration for
human performance and limitation classes.
This is far from sufficient in terms of recommended training hours in comparison with the
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (IACO). It is also not
sufficient to prevent student pilots’ risks of having accidents or incidents due to human
factors with the given curricula.
With the continuous growth of the Korean air transport industry and demands for air travel,
demand for pilots has also increased rapidly. To meet the demand for pilots, the Korean
government has approved the establishment of Approved Training Organizations (ATO). The
first ATO was established at the Uljin Flight Training Center in July 2010, with facilities to
train upwards of 200 pilots annually. This is one of the government’s efforts to meet the
increasing demand on civil aviation pilots who are generally foreign pilots or Koreans who
trained at overseas training centers. With this effort, domestic training flight traffic is
expected to increase continually.
The degree of safety on training flights by ATO is regarded as high. However, even at the
ATOs, more than 80% of accidents in air transportation are caused by human factors, and,
mostly, by pilot mistakes. Thus, it is important that student pilots have in-depth knowledge of
safety and abilities in risk management.
This study consists of a survey based on the SHELL model which is designed to prevent
human error. The survey subjects were student pilots so risk factors that can affect training
flights by student pilots can be identified. The survey object was to eliminate risk factors
during training flights, to prevent accidents or incidents. Furthermore, safety management for
training flights can be maintained at a high level.
2. Literature review on human factors
Peterson (1988) developed causal models that classified the reasons for and causes of unsafe
behavior specifically to reduce unsafe behavior by managers by providing practical items.
This causal model can explain the connection between multiple contributing factors leading
up to the event when an accident occurs and configures the process of the primary causal
factor of the human error that lead to work overload, decision error, and traps. The
“overload” component of this model may be defined as an inconsistency in the ability to
work. Mental ability, low cognitive ability, and unconsciousness are the supplementary
causes of what may be defined as “decision-making error.” “Traps” can be created by the
supplementary causes, such as workplace design and incompatibility of instruments and
control devices.
Cooper (1998) claimed that there were mutual relationships between the organization’s safety
management system, perceptions, and attitudes about safety, and daily goal-oriented behavior.
A reciprocal safety culture model is confirmed in organization experiences that have
numerous different components relationships.
Reason (1990) explained how a human contributes to the cause of accidents or is involved in
accidents in the complex and interconnected aviation industry. He emphasized that only one
occurrence of negligence or unsafe behavior in the complex system does not lead to accidents.

Accidents are caused when each element occurs organically or there is already potential risk
existing in the current system.
Reason hypothesized that accidents were caused by one or more of four levels of failure:
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts
themselves. The defenses against these failures were modeled and when all the individual
barriers weaknesses aligned, accidents or incidents occurred, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Reason's "Swiss Cheese" model

Figure 2. HFACS Model
Reason(1990) and Weigmann & Shappell (1997) introduced the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS), which was used to analyze Navy and Marine Corps flight
accidents. HFACS is a comprehensive human-error framework developed from the Swiss
cheese model and it identifies the human causation of accidents, and provides tools to aid the
investigation process, as illustrated in Figure 2.
O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, and Morrison (1994) claimed that humans were the major cause of
civil and military aviation accidents among human-machine interface, environment, and
communication.

ICAO addressed in their Investigation of Human Factors of accidents and incidents document,
adopting an investigation approach to human factors in aviation accidents and incidents that
has not been effective even accepting that ‘humans make errors’. Thus, investigating
authorities and investigators have difficulties in investigating the human factor contribution
to accidents.
The most basic approach to investigating human factors in accidents and incidents is
Reason’s Accident Causation model. ICAO recommends that aviation accident investigators
investigating human factors must have in-depth knowledge in aviation and various elements
that could affect pilots on flight duty.
Weigmann & Shappell (2001) claims that if the current aviation accidents rate was not going
to decrease further, given how aviation traffic is expected to grow in the next 10 years, there
would be a major accident occurring every week.
Taneja (2002) found that human error had been implicated in almost 70-80% of civil and
military aviation accidents. He proposed a holistic approach to minimize aircraft accidents
and aimed to provide a composite and macroscopic view of the activities within the aviation
environment that can be targeted to produce the desired result. He also emphasized that the
influence of safety culture in integrating the diverse components of an accident prevention
program is important.
3. Theoretical Background of the study
3.1 Study on Human Factors
3.1.1 Definition of Human Factors
Human factors can be defined as the discipline of study that deals with any factor that can
affect human behavior, physically or psychologically. Human factors not only focuses on
pilot performance, but can also be applied to all aviation personnel, such as air traffic
controllers, maintenance personnel, and dispatchers. Human factors has also been referred to
as ergonomics. Murrell (1965) used the term ‘ergonomics,’ and it became generalized due to
his book title. He defined ergonomics as ‘the scientific study of the relationship between man
and his working environment.’
Human factors, in a broad sense, deals with the user and the system the user is in, such as the
human-machine interface, human-human interface, human procedures, and human
environments. ‘Human factors’ is widely used in US and ‘ergonomics’ is used more generally
internationally.
3.1.2 Introduction of the Study of Human Factors in Aviation
After World War II, human factors studies were initiated due to the need to improve
productivity of nations and industries through hiring appropriate employees who could
conduct duties efficiently while at the same time providing systematic training.
In the UK, the Ergonomics Research Society (ERS) in 1949 and the International Ergonomics
Association (IEA) in 1959, and in the US, Human Factor Society (HFS) in 1957 were
established to study systemically ergonomic issues including human factors and those studies
began to be applied to industry sectors.

In the aviation sector, through investigation results of major and minor accidents and
incidents, human factors became a key factor in flight safety, and some countries developed
human factors courses for aviation personnel in various forms. NASA and the US FAA
collected extensive human error data through the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
to investigate human factors as a research project. Similarly, through the Confidential Human
Factors Reporting Programme (CHRIP) in the UK, the Confidential Aviation Safety
Reporting Program (CASRP) in Canada, and the Confidential Aviation Incident Report
(CAIR) in Australia, research on human factors was executed.
In March 1977, due to a breakdown of coordination between cockpit crew and air traffic
controllers, KLM B-747 and Pan Am B-747 collided on the runway at Los Rodoes airport,
Tenerife, and of 637 passengers, 583 people died.
In December 1978, a United Airlines aircraft en route to Portland, Oregon, crashed due to
breakdowns in cockpit management and teamwork. Ten passengers died and 28 passengers
were seriously injured.
According to analyses of various aircraft accidents, including these two major accidents, it
was found that accidents were caused by lack of coordination between the cockpit crew and
air traffic controllers. Thus, the importance of close cooperation and coordination between
associated personnel during flights became apparent, and various international organizations
including ICAO and regional organizations such as NASA and the FAA started to study
human factors for the effectiveness and safety of crew work during flights.
3.1.3 Theory of SHELL model
Various industries including the aviation sector have realized the need for understanding
human factors and the utilization and application of this understanding to protect humans and
properties and enhance to productivity through maximizing efficiency in the workplace.
To this end, Elwyn Edward developed the SHEL (software, hardware, environment,
liveware) model that visualizes the interrelationships among the crew and the aircraft system
components systematically.
Edward argued that human factors theory is more problem solving-oriented rather than
theory-oriented. He also argued that it is essential that human performance and its limitations
must be perceived together to resolve the discrepancies between of humans and their
surrounding environments.
Frank H. Hawkins, a former captain at KLM, modified Edwards’ SHEL model into a
‘building block’ structure as can be seen below figure 3. The SHELL model adopted a system
perspective that suggests the human is rarely the sole cause of an accident.
The components of the SHELL model are also software, hardware, environment, and
liveware. These components represent the building blocks of human factors as they pertain to
the human’s interaction with each component. The human element, the most critical
component, is at the center of the SHELL model.
In the center of the model, “L” represents liveware, which means humans in the workplace;
for example, cockpit crew, air traffic controllers, management, administration personnel, and
maintenance personnel. The other system component must be carefully adapted and matched
to this central component to accommodate human limitation.
The “L” on the right side of the model stands for those persons at the front line of operation
who conduct duties, and thus represents the human-to-human interaction in aviation
operations.
“H” is hardware, which is any physical element of the aviation system, such as aircraft,
operator equipment, tools, computers, and even buildings.

“S” is software and represents the non-physical and intangible aspects of the aviation system
that govern how the aviation system operates, including rules, instructions, regulations, laws,
checklists, operating procedures, symbology, computer programs, and procedural checklists.
“E” represents the environment, which includes physical factors like cabin temperature, air
pressure, humidity, noise, ambient light levels, and physical environment within an aircraft,
as well as factors outside the work area, such as weather, terrain, and physical facilities.

Figure 3. SHELL model

Figure 4. Failures of the SHELL model contribute to human factor-related
incidents
The SHELL model indicates relationships between people and other system components and
therefore provides a framework for optimizing the relationship between people and their
activities within the aviation system. As any component that surrounds liveware can directly
affect aircraft operations. The interaction and interface of those components should be kept at
an optimum level to maintain efficiency and ensure safety. A mismatch of the interface of
people and other system components, such as Liveware-Software (L-S), Liveware-Hardware
(L-H), Liveware-Environment (L-E), Liveware-Liveware (L-L), and Liveware(L), can be a
major source of human error (Fig. 4).
3.1.4 Current state of Human Factors Training
Training on human factors is meant to influence an aviation professional’s attitudes and
behavior; thus, training should be conducted over the long term, systemically and periodically,
rather than for a short period in the aviation professional’s career. Furthermore, such positive
attitude and behavioral changes should be habituated through constant management and
supervision.
ICAO encourages human factors training by setting standards for human factors education for
aviation personnel to be aware at human factors, such as human performance and its
limitations, and to foster basic human factors knowledge. However, standardized program
development for technical training on human factors is not part of many aviation education

programs. This is because implementation methods and program contents may vary widely
due to the unique circumstances of training environments. Thus, regional seminars on human
factors are held periodically to realize the rational procedures of the program. A description
of ICAO’s recommended Human factors training for aviation personnel is provided in
Table 1.
Table 1. Human Factors Curriculum
Subject

Curriculum

Hours
(HH:MM)

Percentage (%)

1
2
3
4

Introduction of Human Factors
Physiology
Psychology
Fitness for Duty

5
20
30
5

1:45
7:00
10:30
1:45

5

Liveware-Hardware

5

1:45

6
7
8

Liveware-Software
Liveware-Liveware
Liveware-Environment

10
15
10

3:30
5:15
3;30

Total

8 Subjects

100

35:00

Source : ICAO, Doc 9683 - Human Factors Training Manual, 2013
3.2 Theoretical review on training flight
3.2.1 Definition of training flight
A training flight can be defined as instruction received from a flight school to accumulate
flight experiences to obtain a flight certificate.
In Korea, according to the Aviation Act, Article 35, a training flight is explained as a practice
flight performed by a person holding a certificate of flight and a medical examination for the
aircrew on board an aircraft (limited to aircraft of limited categories) other than that of a
limited class or type, under the supervision of a person holding a certificate of qualification
and a medical examination for the aircrew by which he/she is allowed to pilot the aircraft,
including those who are designated by the Minister of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs.
Practice flights have to be performed under the supervision of a person holding a flight
instruction certification after obtaining permission from the Minister of Land, Transport, and
Maritime Affairs. When any person who has received written permission for practice flights,
he or she has to carry the written permission and certificate of medical examination for the
crew. In case of US, the FAA does not permit practice flight but issue student pilot
certificates for solo flight.
3.2.2 Flight training center status
In Korea, flight training centers are authorized to conduct training flights; hence, they are also
called Authorized Training Organizations (ATOs). The government designates ATOs to train
pilots. Excluding the Air Force, Army, and Navy, there are three ATOs: the Flight Training
Center of Korea Aerospace University, Hanseo University Flight Training Center, and Uljin
Flight Training Center.
A flight training center can be categorized as a training center for the airlines to train their
own staff, and specialized educational institutions that are designated by the Ministry of Land,

Transport, and Maritime Affairs under the Aviation Act, Article 29-3, and the Ministerial
Regulation of Aviation Act, Article 93.
There are no specific requirements to establish an airline flight training center in Korea but
government approval is required for certification of education regulations, training subjects
and methods (including the training program), training equipments and tools, and status of
the inspectors.
A designated ATO is required to set an education plan containing education subjects and
education methods, as well as a training discipline for the purpose of training qualified pilots
and carrying out designated duties effectively. Korea Aerospace University, Hanseo
University, the Air Force, Army, and Navy are designated to operate such programs.
Designated ATOs can be categorized as military training institutions and civil training
institution (Table 2). In this study, we surveyed students who trained at civil training
institutions. For civil training institutions, there are Korea Aerospace University and Hanseo
University, and the Uljin Flight Training Center that was co-opened by Korea Aerospace
University and Hanseo University. The status of flight training centers is shown in the table.
Table 2. Current state of Korea’s Approved Training Organizations
3 Months
9 Months
3 Months
3 Months
6 Months
12 Months
3 Months
17 Months(82 Weeks)

Available Trainee number
(Annually)
150
90
30
30
20
40
20
120

Commercial pilot(Ⅰ)

72 Weeks

50

Commercial pilot (Ⅱ)

3.5 Months(15 Weeks)

50

Certified flight instructor

1 Week

90

Commercial pilot

27 Weeks

80

Commercial pilot

13 Weeks

50

Instrument flight certificate

8 Weeks

30

Private pilot

22 Weeks

30

Commercial pilot

-104 Weeks (Fixed)
-160Weeks (Rotational)

30

Instrument flight certificate

10 Weeks

50

Certified flight instructor
Private/Commercial

8 Weeks
14 Weeks

25
25

-

-

1,100 Annually

Course
Private pilot
Korea Aerospace Commercial pilot
University
Instrument flight certificate
(12 Aircraft)
Certified flight instructor
Private pilot
Hanseo University
Commercial pilot
(12 ircraft)
Certified flight instructor
Commercial pilot
Air force
(160 Aircraft)

Army
(65 Aircraft)

Navy
(59 Aircraft)

Total

Training Period

Source: Ministry of Land, Transport, The Office of Aviation, 2013.
4. Study Design
4.1 Study Model

The study model was created based on the SHELL model of Hawkins (1975). The SHELL
model is generally used to understand human factors, and it helps to understand the
interaction between human, software, equipment, and environmental factors.
In the study, it was presumed that human factors, based on the SHELL model, will have an
effect on the safety of training flights, and we also hypothesized that human factors will vary
by flight experiences and characteristics of the organization. The model for the study was
designed based on those assumptions.

Figure 5-1.
StudyModel
Model
Figure
4. Study
4.2 Sample Composition
The study subjects were 3rd- and 4th-year university student pilots from flying courses and
helicopter flying courses, and members of the general public who were certified pilots. In
total, 121 surveys were distributed between the October 10 and 20, 2010; one faulty survey
was eliminated. Thus, in total, 120 surveys were analyzed and the description of the sample
composition is provided in the table. Table 3 provides the demographic characteristics of the
sample.
Table 3 provides the demographic characteristics of the sample.
Division

Affiliation

Grade

Flying training course

Flying Hours

Percentage

Male
Female
Flying course
Flying Helicopter course
General Trainee
3rd Year
4th Year
General Trainee
Private pilot course
Instrument flight course

120
118
2
61
21
38
41
41
38
93
4

100%
98.3%
1.7%
50.8%
17.5%
31.7%
34.2%
34.2%
31.7%
77.5%
3.3%

Commercial pilot course

23

19.2%

1-50
51-100
Over 101

61
31
28

50.8%
25.8%
23.3%

Total
Gender

Frequency

4.3 Hypothesis of the study
In the study, we attempted to assess how variables such as accident hazards, flight
experiences, and organizational culture could affect human factors, as described in the
SHELL model. In the study, thus, the hypotheses set out below were assessed in terms of

how three variables, accident hazards, flight experiences, and organization characteristics,
can affect the on interaction between liveware and other system components; that is, how
each interaction is perceived to have a human factors effect on safe aircraft operations.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1-1. Accident hazards and Liveware are interrelated.
Hypothesis 1-2. Accident hazards and Liveware-Software are interrelated.
Hypothesis 1-3. Accident hazards and Liveware-Hardware are interrelated.
Hypothesis 1-4. Accident hazards and Liveware-Environment are interrelated.
Hypothesis 1-5. Accident hazards and Liveware-Liveware are interrelated.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2-1. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware that affects
safety will be greater.
Hypothesis 2-2. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Software
that affects safety will be greater.
Hypothesis 2-3. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Hardware
that affects safety will be greater.
Hypothesis 2-4. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of LivewareEnvironment that affects safety will be greater.
Hypothesis 2-5. With a lower amount of flight experience, the impact of Liveware-Liveware
that affects safety will be greater.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3-1. The impact of Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot organization
characteristics.
Hypothesis 3-2. The impact of Liveware-Software that affects safety will differ by pilot
organization characteristics.
Hypothesis 3-3. The impact of Liveware-Hardware that affects safety will differ by pilot
organization characteristics.
Hypothesis 3-4. The impact of Liveware-Environment that affects safety will differ by pilot
organization characteristics
Hypothesis 3-5. The impact of Liveware-Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot
organization characteristics,
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1 Reliability Analysis
First, a reliability analysis was conducted for each survey item under SHELL model’s human
factors variables. The Liveware, Liveware-Software, Liveware-Hardware, LivewareLiveware factors’ reliability analysis results were all used without elimination because the
α value was greater than 0.6, the ‘standard’ reliability value.
The result of the reliability analysis for Liveware-Environment was an α value of 0.586, less
than the 0.6 standard reliability value. To increase the overall reliability of the Liveware–
Environment factor, item 18 was removed, which was regarded as the least reliable item.
When this item was removed, Cronbach’s α value was 0.605. Thus, without item 18, the
Liveware-Environment factor can be used as a reliable measuring factor.

Table 4. Reliability Analysis
Factor

Liveware

Liveware-Software

Liveware-Hardware

LivewareEnvironment

Liveware-Liveware

Measuring Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Eliminated Item
Cronbach’s α
.725
.631
.683
.687
.631
.718
.677
.481
.545
.686
.463
.545
.708
.690
.759
.745
.756
.605
.485
.549
.498
.491
.766
.718
.592
.619
.599

Cronbach’s α

.714

.601

.774

.586

.714

5.2 Factor Analysis
Factor analysis was conducted with those factors that passed reliability verification. The
number of factor was determined when the eigenvalue was greater than 1, and the common
factor was set with a standard factor loading of 0.5. Principal component analysis was used as
the extraction model, and the varimax rotation among orthogonal rotation was used for the
analysis. Result of the factor analysis of the liveware variables are listed in Table 5 and two
factors were derived. Factor 1 was ‘Pilots’ internal factor’ and factor 2 is ‘Pilot’s capability.’
Table 5. Results of factor analysis of liveware
Question Number
3
2
7
1
4

Factor 1
.869
.772
.580
.521
.134

Factor 2
-.145
.279
.298
.030
.788

6

-.084

.767

5
Eigenvalue
Variance Ratio
Cumulative Ratio

.468
2.702
38.6%
38.6%

.690
1.376
19.7%
58.3%

The second human factor was the interaction of Liveware-Software. The results of the factor
analysis on variables are provided in Table 6, and two factors are derived, “Adequacy of
Flight log book” as factor 1 and “Skipping Checklist” as factor 2.
Table 6. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Software
Question Number
8
12
9
11
10
Eigenvalue
Variance Ratio
Cumulative Ratio

Factor 1

Factor 2
.073
-.110
.081
.400
.963
1.019
20.4%
63.1%

.787
.743
.668
.650
.018
2.133
42.7%
42.7%

The interaction of Liveware-Hardware variable’s factor analysis result can be found in
Table 7. One factor was derived, “Equipments in cockpit.”
Table 7. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Hardware
Question Number
14
13
17
16
15
Eigen value
Variance Ratio
Cumulative Ratio

Factor 1
.831
.794
.686
.675
.657
2.679
53.6%
53.6%

From the fourth human factor, Liveware-Environment variable, two factors were derived
through the reliability analysis. The analysis results are listed in Table 8: factor 1 was
“Organizational culture” and factor 2 was “Weather/obstacle.”
Table 8. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Environment
Question Number

Factor 1

Factor 2

21
22
20
19

.864
.795
.039
.219

.061
.187
.872
.791

Eigenvalue

1.836

1.018

Variance Ratio
Cumulative Ratio

45.9%
45.9%

25.4%
71.3%

From the factor analysis of the interaction of Liveware-Liveware, two factors were derived
and the results are given in Table 9.
Factor 1 was “Human relationship outside aircraft” and factor 2 was “Human relationship
inside aircraft.”
Table 9. Results of factor analysis of Liveware-Liveware
Question Number

Factor 1

Factor 2

26
27
25
23
24
Eigenvalue
Variance Ratio
Cumulative Ratio

.904
.882
.847
-.023
.230
2.517
50.3%
50.3%

.011
.117
.188
.836
.756
1.168
23.4%
73.7%

The values of factors derived from the factor analysis were converted to provide new values
that could be used for the analysis of hypothesis verification.
5.3 Hypothesis Verification and Analysis
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1 Verification
The most correlated factors among human factors were Liveware, especially ‘pilot’s
capability,’ followed by Liveware-Hardware from the analysis of Hypothesis 1 verification.
That can be explained as a student pilots’ flight capability, and knowledge of academics and
regulations, are critical for training flight safety. ‘Equipment in cockpit’ is concluded to be
associated with an accident hazard; this is presumably the result of students using different
aircraft each time. Thus, adaptability and judgment in operate equipment will be significantly
related to flight safety.
Finally, the “Weather/obstacle” factor has a correlation of 0.42 with accident hazard because
weather and obstacles can be issues with pilots in the case of visual flights. This matter is
considered to actually involve in-training flight safety.
Table 10. Hypothesis 1 verification summary
Hypothesis
1-1. Accident hazards and Liveware are interrelated.
1-2. Accident hazards and Liveware-Software are
interrelated.
1-3. Accident hazard and Liveware-Hardware are
interrelated.
1-4. Accident hazard and Liveware-Environment are
interrelated.
1-5. Accident hazard and Liveware-Liveware are
interrelated.

Measuring Factor
Pilot’s internal Factor
Pilot’s capability
Flight
log
data
Adequacy
Skipping checklist

Coefficient
correlation
.494**
.513**
.227*
.223*

Reference
Adopt
Hypothesis
Reject
Hypothesis

Equipment in cockpit

.487**

Adopt
Hypothesis

Organization culture
Weather/ Terrain
Human relationship
inside aircraft

.271**
.422**

Adopt
some

.037

Reject
Hypothesis

Human relationship
outside aircraft

-.257**

** correlation coefficient’s level of significance is 0.01.
* correlation coefficient’s level of significance is 0.05.

5.3.2 Hypothesis 2 verification
The hypothesis analysis results showed significant differences in “Pilot’s internal factor” and
“Pilot capability.” However, according to average tendency, ‘Pilot’s capability’ is affected
more when ‘Pilot’s capability’ is less, due to lower flight experience. However, as “Pilot’s
internal factor” is larger, it is affected more. This may be explained as more experienced
student pilots having difficulties during flights due to lack of management of their own
condition.
In pilots having lower levels of flight experience, it is considered that they have difficulties in
using flight information and handling equipment appropriately. The “Human relationship
outside the aircraft” of the Liveware-Liveware factor showed significant differences;
however, looking at the average, there was no tendency as the level of flight experience was
lower, so this hypothesis was rejected.
Table 11. Hypothesis 2 verification summary
Hypothesis
2-1. As flight experience is lower, value of Liveware
that affects safety will be greater.

2-2. As flight experience is lower, value of LivewareSoftware that affects safety will be greater.
2-3. As flight experience is lower, value of LivewareHardware that affects safety will be greater.
2-4. As flight experience is lower, value of LivewareEnvironment that affects safety will be greater.

2-5. As flight experience is lower, value of LivewareLiveware that affects safety will be greater.

Measuring
Factor
Pilot’s internal
Factor
Pilot’s capability
Flight log data
Adequacy
Skipping
checklist
Equipments in
cockpit
Organization
culture
Weather/ Terrain
Human
relationship
outside aircraft
Human
relationship
inside aircraft

pvalue
0.044
0.005
0.000
0.175
0.039
0.179
0.963
0.367

0.016

Average
tendency
Getting
smaller
Getting
bigger
Getting
bigger
Getting
smaller
Getting
bigger
No
tendency
No
tendency
No
tendency
No
tendency

Reference
Adopt
some

Adopt
some
Adopt
Hypothesis
Reject
Hypothesis

Reject
Hypothesis

Level of significance is P < 0.05.

5.3.3 Hypothesis 3 verification
Hypothesis 3 was analyzed to compare the difference of human factors depending on the
characteristics of the student pilots. Only Liveware-Software factor was rejected and others
were adopted or adopted partially.

“Pilot’s internal factor” among the Liveware factors showed a statistically significant analysis,
indicating that in a group of student pilots, internal factors have great impacts. This is
because by student pilots are mentally burdened because their flying is evaluated every time
and reflected in their grades.
The analysis also showed that “Cockpit equipment” had an enormous influence on general
public student pilots. This may be explained as the general public student pilots fly
infrequently; consequently, they relatively rarely use cockpit equipment, compared with other
students pilots who are more familiar with cockpit equipment and operation principles.
Therefore there are differences between the two types of student pilots.
“Organization culture” in the Liveware-Environment factors showed a statistically significant
difference. It was compared according to the characteristic of pilot groups; differences can be
seen in the ‘Organization culture.’ Organization culture of the current students was shown to
have a greater effect on flights because the relationships between senior and junior, power
distances between instructors and students, and military organization are involved in the
formation of the organization culture and even affect the actual flights.
It was also seen that there was a significant difference in the “Human relationship inside
aircraft” factor. Humans inside the aircraft are instructors and students, and the actual flight
performance can vary a lot depending on the students and instructors, as students are affected
by the instructor and the relationship can affect training flight safety.
Table 12. Hypothesis 1 verification summary
Hypothesis
3-1. Value of Liveware that affects safety will differ by pilot
organization characteristics.

3-2. Value of Liveware-Software that affects safety will differ
by pilot organization characteristics.
3-3. Value of Liveware-Hardware that affects safety will
differ by pilot organization characteristics.
3-4. Value of Liveware-Environment that affects safety will
differ by pilot organization characteristics.

3-5. Value of Liveware-Liveware that affects safety will differ
by pilot organization characteristics.

Measuring
Factor
Pilot’s internal
Factor
Pilot’s
capability
Flight log data
Adequacy
Skipping
Checklist
Equipments in
cockpit
Organization
culture
Weather/
Terrain
Human
relationship
inside aircraft
Human
relationship
outside aircraft

p-value
0.022
0.536
0.700
0.880
0.016
0.009
0.429

Reference
Adopt
some

Reject
Hypothesis
Adopt
Hypothesis
Adopt
some

0.036
Adopt
some
0.564

Level of significance is P < 0.05.

6. Conclusions
Human factors in aviation generally have been studied extensively; however, human factors
in student pilots have not been studied before. As can be seen in previous studies, there were
very strong relationships between accident hazards and human factors. Especially,

relationships among Liveware and Liveware-Hardware were strongly related to flight safety.
Organization Culture strongly affects humans; even though there was not direct effect on
accident hazard, it can, however, be regarded as a potential risk factor for accidents. To
improve overall safety in aviation, the aviation industry needs to take human factors seriously
as a priority for safety. Thus, airlines in Korea continually strive to prevent any accidents or
incidents from human factors through human factor training, such as CRM and LOFT.
However, human factors training in flight training centers currently is far from sufficient to
effectively educate students, and student pilots do not recognize human factors as potential
risk factors that can lead to accidents in flights. Flight training centers must recognize this
issue and must improve and develop further human factors training and education.
To study the effects of human factors on flight safety, it is critical to analyze the degree of
human factors influence in actual accidents. Limitations of this study include the lack of
training flight accident statistics; accident hazard variables were derived from only the
sample subjects’ own accidents experiences. Thus, critical factors that can lead to actual
accidents could not be included in the analysis. In particular, although skipping checklists can
lead to accidents directly, checklist skipping was not significant in the accident hazard
analysis in this study. Thus, it is recommended to address this limitation through constantly
collecting data on actual aviation incidents and aviation safety barriers that can create
accurate accident analyses.
The most critical factor in flight training is the interaction between students and instructor.
The interaction with an instructor significantly influences student performance. However, an
in-depth examination on the interaction between students and instructor was not conducted in
this study; thus, it needs to be examined thoroughly in the future to improve training flight
safety.
Human factors that can lead to accidents have a significant potential risk that has not been
revealed yet. Consequently, a detailed human factors study has limitations. It is clear that the
risks related to human factors are greater than the values from this analysis because accidents
cannot be predicted. Despite this limitation, a human factors study on training flights was
conducted in this study with the intention of improving training flight safety and increasing
safety awareness of student pilots. Clearly, further research is required to analyze human
factors not only with student pilots, but also flight instructors and other related personnel.
Such research can help to enhance overall safety of training flights while meeting the
increased training flights demand.
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